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Abstract
In this paper we construct a two-country search model to determine the nominal exchange
rate between two ﬁat monies. Our model allows agents to use any currency to trade for goods
in all countries. However, search frictions restrict agents’ opportunities for instantaneous
arbitrage, and hence make the nominal exchange rate determinate. The nominal exchange
rate depends on the two countries’ economic fundamentals, including the stocks and growth
rates of the two monies. Direct exchanges between currencies are essential and they imply
a nominal exchange rate that is diﬀerent from the relative price between the two currencies
in the goods markets. There are persistent violations of the law of one price and purchasing
power parity in equilibrium, despite the fact that prices are perfectly ﬂexible and all goods
are tradeable between countries. Nominal and real exchange rates can move together in the
steady state in response to money growth shocks.
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In this paper we construct a two-country search model to determine the nominal exchange rate
between two ﬁat monies. Our model allows agents to use any currency to trade for goods in
all countries. However, search frictions restrict agents’ opportunities for instantaneous arbitrage.
These restrictions bind whenever the (gross) growth rates of the two currency stocks exceed
the discount factor. In this case the nominal exchange rate is determinate and depends on the
two countries’ economic fundamentals, including the stocks and growth rates of the two monies.
Direct exchanges between currencies are essential and they imply a nominal exchange rate that
is diﬀerent from the relative price between the two currencies in the goods markets. Unless the
stocks of the two monies remain constant, there are persistent violations of the law of one price
and purchasing power parity in equilibrium despite the fact that prices are perfectly ﬂexible and
all goods are tradeable between countries. Nominal and real exchange rates can move together
in the steady state in response to money growth shocks.
It is a challenging task to construct theoretical models of the nominal exchange rate. Existing
theories have disagreed as to whether the nominal exchange rate is even determinate. Central
to the diﬃculty is to what extent the relative price between two ﬁat monies is determined by
economic fundamentals (e.g., stocks and growth rates of the ﬁat monies, aggregate output, etc.)
or by non-fundamental factors such as expectations. In many monetary models the nominal
exchange rate is a function only of the former. Such fundamental theories of exchange rates
assume particular roles for each currency. For example, Lucas (1982) assumes a cash-in-advance
constraint which requires buyers to use the currency of the seller’s country to purchase goods,
and Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1995) assume that real money balances enter agents’ utility functions.
In contrast, non-fundamental theories argue that the nominal exchange rate is indeterminate if
money is ﬁat — having no value in either production or utility. For example, using an overlapping
generations model, Kareken and Wallace (1981) reach the stark conclusion that a continuum of
1values for the nominal exchange rate are consistent with equilibrium.1
The heart of the non-fundamentalist position is that a determinant nominal exchange rate
is incompatible with unrestricted substitution between intrinsically useless objects. The cash-
in-advance assumptions of Lucas (1982) constrain agents to use only one currency in particular
trades. In contrast, we allow agents in both countries to use either currency to purchase goods
in either country. Unlike Kareken and Wallace (1981) we do not assume that agents can make
costless arbitrage between matches in the goods market that involve diﬀerent currencies, thus
generating determinant nominal exchange rates.
In our model there are two countries, between which all goods are tradeable. There are many
households in each country. Each household consists of many members and is specialized in pro-
duction and consumption. Because there is no double coincidence of wants in barter between two
randomly matched households, money is necessary for exchanges. Each country issues one cur-
rency, which is intrinsically useless. The deﬁning characteristics of a country are that households
in each country receive transfers of a particular currency and that they meet each other more
frequently than they meet households of the other country. A household can choose how much
of each currency to hold and how often to use each currency to transact. There is no restriction
on which money must be used in each type of exchange.
There are, however, two restrictions on trade. One is that an individual household member
can carry only one money (i.e., not both) into each match, although he/she may carry diﬀerent
monies into matches over time. The second is that agents cannot trade across matches. These
restrictions are natural in the search environment. They generate a temporary cash constraint
in each money-goods trade, because agents must complete the trade with the money they carry
into the match. Such a constraint does not bind when gross money growth rates are equal to the
discount factor, in which case the nominal exchange rate is indeterminate. But when gross money
growth rates exceed the discount factor, the trading constraint binds and the nominal exchange
rate is determined uniquely through direct currency exchange. One currency has a higher price
1Manuelli and Peck (1990) extended this result to a stochastic environment.
2than the other currency if it has a lower initial stock and a lower growth rate in supply. This
dependence of nominal exchange rates on fundamentals is similar to that in Lucas (1982), but it
does not rely on Lucas’s restriction on the particular use of each currency.
There are direct currency-for-currency exchanges between the two countries, provided that
the stocks of the two monies do not both remain constant. Households trade currencies across
countries in order to achieve optimal portfolios of money holdings, which equate the relative values
of the two currencies across countries. Country-speciﬁc monetary transfers distort households’
money holdings and push the two countries’ relative values of the two currencies away from the
equilibrium parity. Direct currency trades are an eﬃcient means for households to return their
money holdings to the optimal portfolio and to restore equilibrium. These currency trades are
redundant in conventional models because they can be replaced by a chain of trades through the
goods market, i.e., trading one money for goods ﬁrst and then goods for the other money. In the
search model, however, a direct currency trade is indispensable for balancing portfolios because
(1) it takes a shorter time than the chain of trades through the goods market, and (2) it transfers
money balances perfectly (linearly) across countries, as opposed to a non-linear transfer through
the goods market.2 The nominal exchange rate implied by direct currency trades deviates from
the relative price between the two currencies implied by the chain of trades in the goods market
if and only if the stocks of the two currencies grow at diﬀerent rates.
If the two monies grow at diﬀerent rates, then there are also violations of the law of one price
in equilibrium. Suppose that money 1 grows more quickly than money 2 and both grow at high
rates (the opposite results occur when both monies grow at low rates). Then country 1 buyers
pay lower prices than country 2 buyers do, even after controlling for the seller’s country index and
the currency used. Also, country 1 sellers charge lower prices than country 2 sellers do, even after
controlling for the buyer’s country index and the currency used. The reason for these violations
of the law of one price is that the nominal exchange rate, as the relative price between currencies
in direct currency exchanges, can respond to money growth changes in a diﬀerent magnitude
2The transfer is non-linear in the goods market because producers’ cost, measured in utils, is convex.
3from the relative price of goods. At high money growth rates the nominal exchange rate responds
to the money growth diﬀerential by more than the relative price level of goods across countries,
resulting in country 1 households holding less of each money and valuing more of each money
than country 2 households. The high valuation of money by country 1 households induces their
sellers to charge lower prices and their buyers to pay lower prices than country 2 households.
The violations of the law of one price come from the inability to arbitrage between matches
instantaneously, not from traditional sources such as nominal rigidity, the existence of non-traded
goods, or “pricing-to-market” by monopolistic sellers (e.g., Betts and Devereux, 2000). The
violations of the law of one price also imply deviations from purchasing power parity. Moreover,
when both monies grow at high rates, a positive shock to the growth rate of money 1 makes
money 1 depreciate against money 2 by more than the increase in the relative price of goods in
the two countries, thus leading to a depreciation of country 1’s real exchange rate as well.
The economy we study may be seen as extending the search framework of Kiyotaki and
Wright (1989, 1993), although the speciﬁc model we employ is an extension of the one-country
model by Shi (1999), who extends search models to allow for both divisible goods and divisible
money.3 These extensions are necessary for examining money growth, inﬂation and exchange rate
ﬂuctuations, which cannot be examined in models with only divisible goods (e.g., Shi, 1995, and
Trejos and Wright, 1995) or only divisible money (e.g., Green and Zhou, 1998).
The theoretical improvements we make enable us to obtain results that have not been found in
previous search models of multiple currencies. First, we resurrect the fundamentalists’ view that
equilibrium nominal exchange rate depends on the growth rates of the two monies. In contrast,
the nominal exchange rate is ﬁxed at one by the assumption of indivisible money in Shi (1995)
and Trejos and Wright (1996), or by both indivisible money and indivisible goods in Matsuyama
et al. (1993), Zhou (1997) and Wang (2000). Second, we uncover an important reason for direct
currency trades — positive or negative growth of money supply. In previous search models, only
3Although the ﬁrst search model that makes both goods and money divisible is Shi (1997), followed by Shi
(1998), the equilibrium concept in the current paper is closer to that in Shi (1999).
4Zhou (1997) and Wang (2000) are able to generate (essential) direct trades between currencies.
In Zhou (1997) these exchanges are motivated by taste shocks and in Wang (2000) by the risk
that government can conﬁscate private agents’ money holdings. Third, the currency market and
the goods market imply diﬀerent relative prices between the two currencies, and this diﬀerence
is an important source of the violations of the law of one price and purchasing power parity. No
such diﬀerence exists in previous search models with ﬂexible nominal exchange rates, or, for that
matter, in any other model that we know.4
Before describing the economy, we want to justify the use of a search model. The search
model captures the time-consuming nature of exchanges in the goods market, which is realistic
and important for supporting a non-trivial role for ﬁat money. For simplicity we also model the
exchanges in the currency market as random matches. This may not be realistic, because currency
exchanges are often centralized and much less costly than goods market exchanges. However, we
will argue in section 8 that allowing agents to exchange currencies in a centralized market does
not change the qualitative results.
2. The search economy
2.1. Countries, goods, and households
Time is discrete and lasts forever. There are two countries, two currencies, and J (≥ 3) types
of non-storable goods. A country i (= 1,2) has the exclusive rights to issue currency i and so
currency i is called the domestic currency of country i. Both currencies are intrinsically useless;
that is, they yield no direct utility and have no use in production. The goods of the same type
are identical in the two countries. There are also J types of households in each country. A type j
household produces only good j and consumes only good j+1(modJ). We call good j household
j’s production good and good j + 1 household j’s consumption good. For simplicity, we assume
4Recently Craig and Waller (2000) also generate direct currency exchanges in a search model with divisible
money and divisible goods. In their model there are some government agents who randomly match with private
agents and conﬁscate the latter’s money holdings, as in Li and Wright (1998) and Wang (2000). As in Wang’s
model, this conﬁscation risk motivates direct currency exchanges between countries. Craig and Waller’s model is
not analytically tractable since it yields a non-degenerate distribution of money holdings.
5that the utility of consuming q units of consumption goods is a linear function, u(q)=Bq,w h e r e
B>0 is a constant. The cost of producing q units of production goods, measured in terms of
utility, is φ(q)=qσ,w h e r eσ > 1.
Agents are matched bilaterally according to a random-matching technology described below
and their trading histories are private. Because there is no double coincidence of wants in barter,
agents must use currency to exchange for consumption goods. However, there is no restriction
on which currency should be used in a country. Households can choose to use either currency to
transact.
Members of a household in country i:
measure holdings
money 1: ni1 xi1 = mi1/ni1
money 2: ni2 xi2 = mi2/ni2
producers: s N.A.
(2.1)
To describe the matching technology, we describe a typical household in a country. Through-
out we use lower-case letters to denote the variables of this particular household and capital
letters to denote per household variables. A household has a large number of members with total
measure one.5 Each household member is either a producer or a buyer. Among the buyers, there
are holders of money 1 and holders of money 2. In (2.1) we list the notation for the household
members of a typical household in country i. To simplify the analysis, we assume that the mea-
sure of producers in each household is si = s, i =1 ,2, where s ∈ (0,1) is a constant.6 While
this ﬁxes the total measure of buyers in each household, the division of these buyers into holding
domestic money and foreign money is endogenous. That is, the household can choose nik,t h e
measure of members of an individual country i household who hold currency k (i,k =1 ,2). Each
money holder holds only one type of money.
5Throughout this paper we will focus on equilibria where households of diﬀerent types are symmetric within
each country, and will suppress the household subscript j whenever possible. The large number of members in
each household makes this focus possible, because it eliminates the possible non-degenerate distribution of money
holdings induced by random matching. Otherwise, the analysis is intractable. Alternatively, one may model each
agent as the decision unit, who trades a large number of times during each period but consumes only at the end
of the period. This alternative approach is more appealing, but it is more diﬃcult to implement because one must
take care of the sequential interactions of the agent’s activities within a period.
6We ﬁx s because in this paper we want to focus on factors associated with households’ decisions regarding
their portfolio of domestic and foreign currency. It is straightforward to allow households to choose s as well as nik
and doing so will greatly complicate the analysis without aﬀecting the analytical result much. The choice of s in a
similar model (but with a single country and currency) is examined in Shi (1999).
6Matches are random and bilateral. We use the term “trading match” to refer to a match which
may result in trade. There are two types of trading matches. The ﬁrst is a currency trading match,
which occurs between two agents from diﬀerent countries holding diﬀerent currencies. The second
is a money-goods trading match, which occurs between a currency holder from household i and a
producer from household i+1. Money-goods trading matches can be further classiﬁed according
to whether the match is between agents from the same country or from diﬀerent countries. Let
Wik be the aggregate number of money-goods trading matches between holders of money k and
producers from the same country i.L e tW
f
ik be the aggregate number of trading matches between
country i holders of money k and producers from a diﬀerent country i0 6= i, where the superscript














where α,ψ ∈ (0,1). For currency trading matches, we suppress the superscript f and denote Ykk0
the aggregate number of matches between country 1 holders of money k and country 2 holders









The two matching functions emphasize the asymmetry in matching frequencies within and
across countries. Given an agent’s holdings, the frequency of meeting a foreign agent relative to
meeting a domestic agent is α, e.g., W
f
ik = αWik.W i t hα < 1, an agent meets domestic agents
more frequently than meeting foreign agents. In fact, a “country” may be deﬁned as a set of
households that (i) have a relatively high probability of meeting each other, and (ii) receive the
same currency transfer, described immediately below.
7Notice that for a money-goods match to be a trading match there must be a single coincidence of wants, which
occurs with probability 1/J. But for a currency trade, a single coincidence of wants is not necessary, as indicated
by the absence of 1/J in (2.3).
The matching functions W and Y can also diﬀer in the weights. In a money-goods trading match, the weights
are ψ for money holders and 1−ψ for producers. In a money trading match, the weights are 1/2a n d1 /2f o re a c h
agent. We choose the weights (1/2,1/2) for money trading matches because money holders are symmetric a priori.
We choose the weights (ψ,1 − ψ) in money-goods matches to maintain some generality. All analytical results can
hold for ψ =1 /2.
7Country i households receive monetary transfers of only money i, each receiving τit in lump-
sum at the beginning of period t. The monetary authority has no other function than admin-
istrating these lump-sum transfers (or taxes). Let Mkt be the per household stock of money k
world-wide at the end of period t and γkt the gross growth rate of money k from period t to
period t + 1. Then,
τkt+1 =( γkt − 1)Mkt, k =1 ,2. (2.4)
2.2. Trading matches
In (2.5) we list the terms of trade in money-goods trading matches. In such a match, the buyer
makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer, where x is the amount of money paid by the buyer and q is the
amount of goods sold by the producer.8 In section 3 we will describe in detail how (x,q)a r e
determined. The money-goods trades are distinguished by the producer’s country, the buyer’s
country, and the type of money the buyer holds. Thus, there are eight types of money-goods
trades. The ﬁr s ts u b s c r i p to fx indicates the buyer’s country and the second subscript indicates
the type of money he/she holds. Similarly, the ﬁr s ts u b s c r i p to fq indicates the producer’s country
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In (2.6) we list currency trades. In a type I currency trade an agent exchanges the domestic
currency for the foreign currency, where the exchanged quantity is f11 of currency 1 and f22 of
currency 2. In a type II currency trade an agent exchanges the foreign currency for the domestic
currency, where the exchange quantity is f21 of currency 1 and f12 of currency 2. The two types
8The analytical results in this paper do not depend much on the take-it-or-leave-it formulation. In an earlier
version of this paper we allowed both the buyer and the seller to get a positive fraction of the matching surplus,
and the results were similar.
8of currency trades may or may not both occur in an equilibrium. In a currency trading match,
we assume that the agent from country 1 makes all the oﬀers but he/she must give the country
2 agent at least a half of the total surplus (see section 3).9
currency exchange ac o u n t r y2a g e n th o l d i n g :
country 1
agents holding:
money 1 money 2
money 1 no trade f11 ←→ f22 (type I)
money 2 f12 ←→ f21 (type II) no trade
#o fm a t c h e s Y21 Y12
(2.6)
2.3. Timing of events
The timing of events in each period t is as follows. At the beginning of the period, each household
in country i receives a lump-sum transfer of domestic money, τit, but does not receive the transfer
of foreign money. After the transfers, the household’s money holdings are measured. Denote the
household’s holding of money i at this time as miit and of money i0 as mii0t. Then, the household
chooses the measure of members to hold each money, nik (k =1 ,2), and divides the stock of
each money evenly among the corresponding holders. The household also chooses the terms of
trade that the members will propose in trading matches. Matching and trading then follows. (A
producer does not produce until a trade agreement is reached with the buyer.) As an important
restriction, members cannot borrow from each other during a match, and hence must make a
trade under the constraint of the resources they have. After matches and exchanges, members
bring back the trade receipts and left-over stocks. Then the household divides the consumption
goods evenly among members to consume and time proceeds to the next period.
9This setup ensures that the two agents each get a half of the total surplus in equilibrium. This eliminates
arbitrary ﬂuctuations in the exchange rate caused by asymmetric bargaining. One can also eliminate such arbitrary
ﬂuctuations by adopting a sequential bargaining framework where, in each round of bargaining, each side of the
m a t c hi sc h o s e nw i t hp r o b a b i l i t y1 /2t om a k et h eo ﬀer. Our setup is much simpler than such sequential bargaining
and generates equilibrium outcomes that are very close to the latter. In fact, the two setups generete identical
outcomes in the equilibrium where there are two-way currency trades, which is our focus in this paper.
93. A household’s decision problem
We describe the decision problem in period t of a household in country i. Suppress the time index
in this section whenever possible and use the symbol 0 to indicate one-period future variables.
3.1. Choices
Ac o u n t r yi household chooses a vector, hi, which contains the following elements: (i) the measure
of members holding each money k, nik; (ii) future holdings of each money k, m0
ik; and (iii) the
trading decisions for the members who will be in trading matches. There are three types of
decisions that the household prescribes for the members to carry out in trading matches. The
ﬁrst are the proposals of a buyer (holding money k) in a trading match with a domestic producer,




i0k)( i0 6= i). The second are
the producer’s responses to the oﬀer of a domestic buyer holding money k, zik ∈ {0,1},a n dt o
a foreign buyer holding money k, z
f
ik ∈ {0,1},w h e r ez = 1 (0) means accepting (rejecting) the
oﬀer. The third are the decisions for currency trades. For a country 1 household, the decisions
in currency trades are the oﬀers (f11,f 22)( o r( f12,f 21)); for a country 2 household, the decisions
are the responses gI or gII ∈ {0,1} where g = 1 (0) means accepting (rejecting) the trade.
3.2. Money-goods trading matches
Consider ﬁrst a trading match between a buyer in country i holding money k and a producer in the
same country. The terms of trade are (xik,q ik). Let Ωik be a country i representative household’s
marginal value of money k one period in the future, discounted to the current period (see a
formal deﬁnition later). The producer’s surplus from the trade is [Ωikxik − φ(qik)]. Under the
assumption that the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer, the buyer’s household will prescribe
such terms (xik,q ik) that exhaust the producer’s surplus, i.e.,
Ωikxik = φ(qik),i , k =1 ,2. (3.1)
Moreover, because members are temporarily separated from each other during the match, the
household cannot prescribe the terms of trade that require the buyer to propose more money
10than what he/she has. That is,
mik/nik ≥ xik,i , k =1 ,2. (3.2)
Now consider a match between the household’s producer with a domestic holder of money
k. The household prescribes the decision zik ∈ {0,1} for the producer. The buyer in the match
from another household proposes (Xik,Q ik). When this proposal satisﬁes restrictions like (3.1)
and (3.2), zik =1 . 10
One can characterize the trade decisions similarly for money-goods matches between agents
from diﬀerent countries. For a trading match between a country i buyer holding money k and a









i0k),i , k =1 ,2, (3.3)
mik/nik ≥ x
f
ik,i , k =1 ,2. (3.4)
When the household’s member is a producer in such a trade, the decision is z
f





ik)s a t i s ﬁes conditions similar to (3.3) and (3.4).
3.3. Currency trading matches
Consider a type I currency trade, i.e., a match between a country 1 holder of money 1 and a
country 2 holder of money 2. The household in country 1 prescribes (f11,f 22)f o ri t sm e m b e rt o
oﬀer and the household in country 2 instructs its member to either accept the oﬀer or reject the
oﬀer. As discussed earlier, we assume that the country 1 household must give at least a surplus,
max{∆1/2,0}, to the partner, where ∆1 is the total surplus in a similar trade:
∆1 ≡ (Ω12F22 − Ω11F11)+( Ω21F11 − Ω22F22). (3.5)
The ﬁrst diﬀerence on the right-hand side is the surplus to a country 1 household and the second
diﬀerence is the surplus to a country 2 household, where (F11,F 22)a r et h eo ﬀers in a similar
10Although the producer gets zero surplus, the decision zik = 1 is robust. Mixed strategies are not robust because
the buyer can always lower Q slightly to induce the producer to accept the oﬀer with probability 1.
11match and are taken as given by an individual household. In an individual match the restriction
on a minimum surplus for the partner can then be written as:
Ω21f11 − Ω22f22 ≥ max{∆1/2,0}. (3.6)
The household from country 2 accepts the trade (i.e., GI = 1) only when the above restriction is
satisﬁed; otherwise GI =0 .
In addition to the above restriction, the proposer cannot propose to give more than his/her
money holding and cannot ask for more than the partner’s money holding, due to the temporary
separation of agents. Thus, (f11,f 22)m u s ta l s os a t i s f y :
m11/n11 ≥ f11, (3.7)
M22/N22 ≥ f22. (3.8)
Now consider a type II currency trade, i.e., a trade between a country 1 holder of money 2
and a country 2 holder of money 1. The money holder from country 1 makes all the oﬀers, but
the terms of trade (f12,f 21)m u s ts a t i s f y :
Ω22f12 − Ω21f21 ≥ max{∆2/2,0}, (3.9)
m12/n12 ≥ f12, (3.10)
M21/N21 ≥ f21, (3.11)
where
∆2 ≡ (Ω11F21 − Ω12F12)+( Ω22F12 − Ω21F21). (3.12)
The household from country 2 either accepts the trade (GII = 1) or rejects the trade (GII =0 ) .
3.4. A household’s maximization problem
We formulate the maximization problem of a country 1 household. The maximization problem
of a country 2 household is similar, except that it chooses (gI,g II) in currency trades rather than
12the terms of trade. Let the value function of a country 1 household be v(m11,m 12).11 Deﬁne the
discounted, marginal value of money k as
ω1k ≡ βvk(m0
11,m 0
12),k =1 ,2, (3.13)
where vk is the derivative of v with respect to its kth argument. Deﬁne Ω1k similarly for other
households in country 1 and Ω2k for households in country 2, which were used earlier.





































In the expression for consumption, the terms in the ﬁrst bracket are the amount of goods obtained
by the household’s buyers using money 1, and the terms in the second bracket are the amount
obtained using money 2. In the expression for the production cost, the terms in the ﬁrst [.]a r e
the cost incurred by the household’s producers when meeting domestic buyers and the terms in
the second [.] are the cost incurred when meeting foreigner buyers. Notice the distinction between
capital letters and lower-case letters.
Taking all other households’ choices and aggregate variables (capital-case variables) as given,
the household solves the following dynamic programming problem:
(PH1) v(m11,m 12)=m a x
h1
£





n11 + n12 =1− s,
money-goods trading restrictions (3.1) — (3.4),
currency trading restrictions (3.6) — (3.11),
11We suppress the dependence of this value function on aggregate statistics such as aggregate money holdings
(M11,M 12,M 21,M 22) and money transfers.
13m0



























































The last two constraints are the laws of motion of the household’s money holdings. Let us explain
(3.14). (The explanation for (3.15) is similar except that it contains no transfer term, because
the household does not receive transfers of money 2.) After the money transfer in the period
the household has m11 units of money 1. The household’s net payment of money 1 in currency-
trading matches is the ﬁrst [.]. The household’s holders of money 1 each trade away f11 units of
money 1 when meeting foreigners holding money 2 and its holders of money 2 each obtain f21
units of money 1 when meeting foreigners holding money 1. In money-goods trading matches the
household’s total receipt of money 1 is the second [.] and the total payment of money 1 is the
third [.]. That is, the household’s producers each obtain X11 units of money 1 when trading with
domestic buyers and X
f
21 units of money 1 when trading with foreign buyers; the household’s
holders of money 1 each trade away x11 units of money 1 when trading with domestic producers
and x
f
11 when trading with foreign producers. After trading in this period the household brings
the money balance forward to the next period and, after the money transfer in next period
(γ1 − 1)M1, the household’s new balance of money 1 is m0
11.
We have set z1k and z
f
1k to 1 for k =1 ,2, anticipating that the oﬀers by other households’
buyers will provide a non-negative surplus for the producers in equilibrium. We keep the notation
(GI,G II) because the total surplus may be negative in some currency matches.
4. Equilibrium: deﬁnition and conditions
An equilibrium consists of individual households’ choices (h1,h 2), representative household’s de-
cisions (H1,H 2), and aggregate stocks of each money such that (i) given (H1,H 2) and aggregate
money stocks, h1 solves (PH1) and h2 solves a similar problem for a country 2 household; (ii)
14hi = Hi for i =1 ,2, and (3) money markets clear: m1kt +m2kt = Mkt for all t and for k =1 ,2.12
4.1. Types of equilibria
There are three possible types of equilibria, distinguished by the directions of the currency trades.
The equilibrium is of type I if there are only type I currency trades (i.e., country 1 households
exchange money 1 for money 2 with country 2 households), type II if there are only type II
currency trades (i.e., country 1 households exchange money 2 for money 1 with country 2 house-
holds), and type O if there are both types of currency trades. Deﬁne
Π ≡ Ω12Ω21 − Ω11Ω22, (4.1)
e ≡ (Ω11 + Ω21)/(Ω12 + Ω22). (4.2)
The variable e is the world-wide relative value of currency 1 to currency 2, as opposed to country-
speciﬁcr e l a t i v ev a l u e s ,Ω11/Ω12 and Ω21/Ω22. These country-speciﬁcr e l a t i v ev a l u e sa r ee q u a lt o
the world-wide relative values if and only if Π =0 .I fΠ > 0, country 1 has a lower relative value
of currency 1 to currency 2 than country 2; if Π < 0, country 1 has a higher relative value of
currency 1 to currency 2 than country 2.



















where the function µ(·) is such that µ(y)=1i fy>0, and µ(y)=0i fy ≤ 0. In Appendix A we
prove the following lemma:
Lemma 4.1. The nominal exchange rate, deﬁned as the relative price of money 1 to money 2 in
the currency trade, is equal to e in all three types of equilibria. Each agent in a currency trading
match gets a half of the match surplus. Type I equilibrium exists if and only if Π > 0,i nw h i c h



















(1 − µI). (4.4)
12By construction, a household fully takes into account the inﬂuence of its choices of money balances on the
t e r m so ft r a d e .T h i si si nc o m m o nw i t hS h i( 1 999) but in contrast with Shi (1997, 1998).



















(1 − µII). (4.5)
If Π =0 ,t h e n∆1 = ∆2 =0 ,i nw h i c hc a s eat y p eO equilibrium exists and any feasible trade
quantities of currencies with F22 = eF11 are consistent with the equilibrium.
Lemma 4.1 states that the two countries exchange currencies directly in both directions only
if the relative value between the two currencies is the same across countries. Otherwise, the direct
currency trade is one directional, with each country exchanging for the money it values relatively
more than the other country.
4.2. Equilibrium conditions for money-goods trades
Let λik be the shadow price (cost) to a household in country i of the money constraint, (3.2).
Normalize this shadow price by the number of corresponding trading matches.13 Substituting
xik from (3.1) into (3.2) and the household’s maximization problem, we can derive the following
ﬁrst-order condition for qik:





The left-hand side is the marginal utility of consumption and the right-hand side is the marginal
cost of giving up money k for an additional unit of consumption. To obtain an additional unit
of consumption good from a domestic buyer, the buyer must give up σqσ−1
ik /Ωik units of money
k (see (3.1)). The marginal cost of one unit of money k is the sum of expected future value of
money (ωik) and the cost generated by a tighter trading restriction (3.2), λik.
Similarly, let λ
f
ik be the shadow price of (3.4), normalized by the number of corresponding
trading matches. Then the ﬁrst-order condition for q
f
i0k is







,i 0 6= i. (4.7)









164.3. Equilibrium conditions for portfolios
A household’s portfolio decision consists of the total holding of each currency and the number
of members holding each currency. In equilibrium, the choices of money holdings generate the





































































































where Π is deﬁned in (4.1) and (µI,µ II) in (4.3). The left-hand side of each of these equations
is the current value of a currency and the right-hand side is the discounted future value of the
currency plus the non-pecuniary return to holding the currency in the period. The non-pecuniary
return arises from the role of money in alleviating the money constraints in trading matches. For
example, to a country 1 household holding money 1, the non-pecuniary return comes from money-
goods trades and direct currency trades, which are captured by the second and third terms on
the right-hand side of (4.8).14
Optimal decisions on the fractions of members holding each currency, (n11,n 22), obey the








































14The third group of terms do not appear in the equations for Ω21 and Ω22 because a household from country
2 only chooses to accept or reject the currency trades. Since a marginal increase in the money holdings does not
change such decisions, its net marginal beneﬁti sz e r ot oac o u n t r y2h o u s e h o l di nc u r r e n c yt r a d e s .S u c ha s y m m e t r y








































The right-hand side of (4.12) is the net beneﬁto fa ni n c r e a s ei nn11 (accompanied by the same
amount of decrease in n12). The ﬁrst group of terms summarize the net increase in consumption
brought about by the change in the number of money-goods matches to the household’s buyers,
plus the change in the cost of the trading restrictions in such matches (i.e., costs associated with
λ1k and λ
f
1k). The second and third groups of terms summarize the change in the surplus from
currency trades brought about by the change in n11 (and the accompanying change in n12).
An equilibrium is a solution to the equation system consisting of (3.1)—(3.4), (3.14)—(3.15),
(4.1)—(4.13), under symmetry and the money-injection processes in (2.4).
We focus on the type O equilibrium in this paper, because it has the following desirable
properties that type I and type II equilibria do not have: (i) It is immune to our asymmetric
treatment of the two countries in currency trades; (ii) it is much simpler than other equilibria
and an analytical characterization is possible, because Π = 0 in such an equilibrium; and (iii) its
existence does not require extreme money growth rates (see analyses below). In section 8 we will
oﬀer some conjectures on type I and type II equilibria.
In the type O equilibrium the relative value between the two currencies is the same in the two
countries (i.e., Π = 0) and currencies are exchanged directly in both ways (i.e., GI = GII =1 ) .
There are two sub-groups of this equilibrium. In one, the trading restrictions bind in money-goods
trades (i.e., Λ,Λf > 0) and, in the other, these restrictions do not bind. The second sub-group
exists only for non-generic parameter values, as we will show below.
5. Type O equilibrium with binding money constraints
5.1. Characterization of equilibrium and the nominal exchange rate
In this equilibrium, Λ,Λf > 0. Thus, buyers in money-goods trading matches exchange all their
money holdings for goods. That is, Xik = X
f
ik = Mik/Nik for all i,k =1 ,2. For money i,l e tt h e




,i 0 6= i, i =1 ,2. (5.1)
Focus on steady states where Mii/Mi and Nik are stationary (so that θi is stationary). We have
the following Lemma (see Appendix C for a proof):
Lemma 5.1. Consider the steady state of a type O equilibrium and assume Λik,Λ
f
ik > 0 (i,k =
1,2). The quantities of goods exchanged in money-goods trades satisfy the following conditions



















































γi/β − 1+( 1+α)Wii/Nii
γi0/β − 1+( 1+α)Wii0/Nii0
. (5.6)
Eq. (5.2) is the household’s ex ante arbitrage conditions for a producer between selling
t h eg o o d st ob u y e r sf r o md i ﬀerent countries — ex ante in the sense that the terms of trade




i0i, both represent the
quantity of goods a producer sells to a country i0 buyer relative to a country i buyer (for the
same currency i), with the only diﬀerence being in the producer’s country index. Because the
two ratios are equal to each other by (5.2), the two countries’ producers discriminate the buyers
by their origins in the same relative quantity. This quantity discrimination depends solely on the
relative individual holding of the currency by the two countries’ buyers. A producer sells less
goods to a country i0 buyer than to a country i buyer, for the same currency i,i fa n do n l yi fa
country i0 buyer holds a smaller amount of currency i than a country i buyer does (i.e., if θi > 1).
19As we will see later, whether θi > 1 depends on the diﬀerential between the two monies’ growth
rates. An equilibrium does not eliminate the quantity discrimination because the same seller
cannot be simultaneously in matches with the two types of buyers, ruling out ex post arbitrage
between the two matches.
Eq. (5.5) is an ex ante arbitrage condition between the two monies, arising from the house-
hold’s choice of n. It states that the relative quantity of goods that a buyer gets from a domestic
producer using the two monies is inversely related to the growth rates of the two monies.
Eqs. (5.3) and (5.4) come from the household’s choices of the stocks of the two monies
(i.e., from (4.8)—(4.11)). For example, (5.3) states that the “permanent income” from money i
(proportional to the term (γi/β − 1)Qσ
ii)s h o u l db ee q u a lt ot h e“ c a s hﬂow” generated by money
i from alleviating the trading restrictions in money-goods trades.
In addition to the restrictions in Lemma 5.1, the Q’s must also satisfy the equilibrium require-
m e n tt h a tt h er e l a t i v ev a l u eo ft h et w oc u r r e n c i e sb et h es a m ei nt h et w oc o u n t r i e s( i . e . ,Π =0 ) .
This requirement determines a unique distribution of each money in the two countries and hence
a unique nominal exchange rate. We establish the following Proposition in Appendix C.
Proposition 5.2. Assume Λik,Λ
f
ik > 0. The steady state of a type O equilibrium has the
following properties.
(i) The portfolios satisfy N11 = N21, N12 = N22, A(N22)=1 /A(N11),a n dθ2 =1 /θ1,w h e r eNii






The solution for N11, denoted N(γ1,γ2), exists and is unique. Moreover, N(γ1,γ2) is a decreasing
function of γ1 and an increasing function of γ2,w i t hN(γ,γ)=N12 =( 1− s)/2.





A(N(γ1,γ2))[1 − s − N(γ1,γ2)]
. (5.8)
20The nominal exchange rate is a decreasing function of γ1 and an increasing function of γ2.
(iii) Let the net payment of money 1 by country 1 households in the two-way currency trades be




(γ1 − 1)(γ2 − 1) + α[(γ1 − 1)W12/N12 +( γ2 − 1)W11/N11]
γ2 − 1+2 αW12/N12 +( eM1/M2)(γ1 − 1+2 αW11/N11)
, (5.9)
θ1 =
γ1 − 1+αW11/N11 − D/M1
αW11/N11 + D/M1
. (5.10)
This proposition states that the portfolio of money holdings, the allocation of members, and
the nominal exchange rate are all uniquely determined in the steady state of a type O equilibrium
if Λ,Λf > 0. In particular, the nominal exchange rate depends on the fundamentals in intuitive
ways. A high domestic money growth, a low foreign money growth, and a high initial stock of
domestic money relative to foreign money all make the domestic currency weak. If the two monies
have the same growth rate, then the number of household members holding each currency is the
same (i.e., N(γ1,γ2)=( 1− s)/2), in which case A(N(γ1,γ2)) = 1 and the nominal exchange
rate is e = M20/M10. If, in addition, the two monies have the same initial stock, the nominal
exchange rate is 1.
For the nominal exchange rate to be determinate, the net amount of currency traded in direct
currency-for-currency exchanges must be unique. For each value of net currency trades, D,t h e r e
is a unique portfolio of the two monies in each country and hence a unique relative value between
the two monies in each country. The equilibrium value of D is the unique level that ensures the
relative value between the two monies to be the same in the two countries. This equilibrium
value of D is non-zero in general (see the next subsection for more discussions). In contrast,
the gross amounts of currencies traded in either way, (F11,F 22)o r( F12,F 21), are indeterminate,
which are inconsequential for the equilibrium because the laws of motion of money holdings and
hence the money portfolios depend on direct currency trades only through the net amount of
currency trades, not through the gross amounts.
Fundamentally, the nominal exchange rate is determinate because each money has its own
role in facilitating exchanges beyond its function of a store of value. Since each buyer can hold
21only one kind of money at a time, the temporary separation between agents rules out arbitrage
between matches ex post (after matches take place) and, in particular, rules out ex post arbitrage
between the two monies. In a money-goods match the temporary separation restricts a buyer
from spending more than what he/she has. When such restrictions bind, an additional unit of
money has a role in alleviating the trading restrictions. The relative role of the two monies in
alleviating such trading restrictions determines the nominal exchange rate. For this reason, the
nominal exchange rate responds to the fundamentals.
An informal way to understand the determinacy of the nominal exchange rate is to recall a
two-country model with cash-in-advance constraints which require goods to be purchased with the
currency issued by the seller’s country (e.g., Lucas, 1982). In that model the nominal exchange
rate is determinate when the cash-in-advance constraints bind for both currencies. Because the
money-goods trading restrictions in our model serve a similar role, it may not be surprising that
the nominal exchange rate is determinate in the current equilibrium.
However, it would be misleading to draw a strong similarity between our model and Lucas’s.
We do not impose Lucas’s restriction that buyers must use a particular currency for trades in
one country. Rather, agents in our model can use either money to buy goods in each country.
This generality allows us to uncover two essential ingredients for a determinate nominal exchange
rate. Namely, each buyer can bring only one currency into trade at a time and there cannot be
arbitrage between trades during the match. Ex ante (before matches occur), however, agents can
choose the quantity of each money to hold and the number of transactions using each money
(through the choices of the n’s). These ex ante choices lead to particular dependence of the
nominal exchange rate on the fundamentals such as the two monies’ growth rates but they do
not lead to indeterminate nominal exchange rates.
5.2. Net currency trades and relative valuation of money across countries
As we have seen in previous sections, the net amount of direct currency trades and the relative
individual money holdings across countries are important for the nominal exchange rate. In this
22subsection we examine how these variables depend on the fundamentals, such as money growth
rates. The following lemma summarizes the dependence (see Appendix D for a proof):
Lemma 5.3. Consider the steady state of the type O equilibrium with Λ,Λf > 0.W h e nγ2 =1 ,
D>0 if and only if γ1 > 1;w h e nγ1 =1 , D>0 if and only if γ2 > 1. A country 1 household’s










,k =1 ,2, (5.11)
which is less than 1 iﬀ θ1 > 1.T h er a t i oθ1 has the following properties: (i) θ1 =1if γ1 = γ2;
(ii) when γ1,γ2 < 1, θ1 > 1 if and only if γ1 > γ2;a n d( i i i )w h e nγ2 > 1 and γ1 ≈ γ2, θ1 > 1 iﬀ
(γ1 − γ2)(γ2 − γa) < 0 where










Money growth, positive or negative, is the reason for direct currency trades in our model.
When both monies have a constant stock, the net currency trade is zero. A suﬃcient condition
for a country to be a net supplier of its currency in the currency trades is that the supplies of
both monies expand, and a suﬃcient condition for a country to be a net recipient of its currency
is that the supplies of both monies shrink. To explain these results, suppose that the supplies of
both monies expand. Both monies deteriorate in value but, since only the country’s own residents
receive the country’s monetary transfers, the value of money 1 relative to money 2 deteriorates
more quickly in country 1 than in country 2. Thus it is mutually desirable for the two countries’
households to exchange their own currency for the foreign currency in the currency trades. The
net amount of currency traded is such that equalizes the relative value of the two monies between
the two countries. The net currency trade is reversed if the monetary transfers are negative.
Lemma 5.3 also states that the two countries’ valuations of a given currency are the same
if and only if the two monies’ growth rates are the same. When the two monies have diﬀerent
growth rates, one country values both monies more than the other country. Exactly which country
values both monies more depends on the equilibrium distribution of monies. When θ1 > 1( a n d
23so θ2 < 1), country 1 holds more than a half of each money and so values each money less than
country 2. If θ1 < 1, country 1 holds less than a half of each money and so values each money
more than country 2. (In both cases, the relative value between the two monies is the same in
the two countries.)
The variable θ1 depends on the diﬀerential between the two monies’ growth rates. To see this,
set γ2 at an arbitrary level γ,w h e r eγ > β.I fγ1 = γ the two countries are perfectly symmetric
and each country holds a half of the stock of each money, resulting in θ1 =1 . I fγ1 > γ,t h e
two countries exchange their domestic money for foreigner money in direct currency exchanges
in order to equate their relative values between the two monies. If money growth rates are not
very high (i.e., γ1,γ2 < γa), the relative value of the two monies is sensitive to changes in the
nominal exchange rate and so a moderate depreciation of money 1 can restore the equilibrium.
In this case, direct currency trades pass less than a half of money 1 injection from country 1 into
country 2, leaving country 1 holding more of money 1 than country 2 (i.e., θ1 > 1). Since money
1 grows at a higher rate than money 2 and a large fraction of the newly created money 1 is used
to exchange for money 2, country 1 also holds more of money 2 than country 2 in the steady
state (i.e., θ2 < 1).15
If money growth rates are very high (i.e., γ1,γ2 > γa), however, the relative value of the two
monies is not sensitive to changes in the nominal exchange rate. When money 1’s growth rate
is higher than money 2’s, money 1 must depreciate suﬃciently to restore the equality between
the two countries’ relative values of the two monies. The large depreciation entails country 1
households to increase signiﬁcantly the amount of money 1 exchanged for a given quantity of
money 2 in the currency trades. In this case, the currency trades over-correct the asymmetric
money injection and result in country 2 holding more of both monies than country 1.16
15T os e et h i s ,c o n s i d e rt h ee x a m p l eγ2 =1a n dγ1 > 1. In this case, θ1 > 1, as explained above. Because country
1 households obtain money 2 from the currency trades while country 2 households do not receive transfers of money
2, country 1 also holds more of money 2 than country 2.
16The critical level of the money growth rate that distinguishes the above two cases, γa, can be arbitrarily close
t o1w h e nψ → 1 and arbitrarily large when s → 1.
245.3. Existence and uniqueness of equilibrium
So far we have presumed that the money constraints bind in money-goods trading matches. To
establish the existence of a type O equilibrium with Λ,Λf > 0, we must show that Λ,Λf > 0
indeed. The following proposition accomplishes this task for restricted parameter values.
Proposition 5.4. Assume that γ1 and γ2 are suﬃciently close to each other. Then a type O
equilibrium with Λ,Λf > 0 exists and is unique if and only if γ1,γ2 > β and γ1,γ2 ∈ [1/(1 +
α),1+α/(1 + α)].
Proof. We supply the proof for γ1 = γ2. By continuity, the proposition holds for γ1 and γ2
suﬃciently close to each other. Set γ1 = γ2 = γ. Proposition 5.2 implies A(N)=1a n dNik =
(1−s)/2f o ra l li,k =1 ,2; Lemma 5.3 implies θ1 = 1. Then (5.2)—(5.5) imply Q
f
ik = Qik ≡ Q for
all i,k =1 ,2. In this case, (C.2) and (C.3) in Appendix C show that the requirements Λik > 0
and Λ
f
ik > 0 for all i,k =1 ,2 are equivalent to one condition, Qσ−1 <B / σ. This condition is
equivalent to γ > β once we solve the Q’s from (5.3). Finally, since 0 ≤ F11 ≤ M11/N11 and
0 ≤ F21 ≤ M21/N21, the equilibrium must satisfy −Y21M21/N21 ≤ D ≤ Y12M11/N11.U s i n g( 5 . 9 )
to solve for D/M1 =( γ−1)/2, we can rewrite these requirements as 1/(1+α) ≤ γ ≤ 1+α/(1+α).
Clearly, there is only one such equilibrium. QED
The requirement that the two monies have similar growth rates is suﬃcient but may not be
necessary for existence.17 Another requirement for existence is that the money growth rates are
bounded below and above. If both monies grow at rates higher than 1+α/(1+α) or lower than
1/(1+α), at least one side of the currency trade must trade more than what he/she has in order
to equalize the relative value of the two monies between the two countries, which is clearly not
feasible. In these cases, either the equilibrium with Π > 0e x i s t s( i fγ1,γ2 > 1+α/(1+α)) or the
equilibrium with Π < 0e x i s t s( i fγ1,γ2 < 1/(1 + α)).
17To show existence for general (γ1,γ2) one must verify separately that every one of the eight Λ’s is positive and
this is a daunting task.
25For the equilibrium to exist, the (gross) money growth rates must also be greater than the
discount factor, i.e., the money growth rates must exceed the Friedman rule. If both money
growth rates are equal to β, the two monies yield rates of return equal to the discount rate and
the money-goods trading restrictions do not bind, as shown in the next section.
6. Type O equilibria with non-binding money constraints: indeterminacy
We brieﬂy examine equilibria in which the trading restrictions in money-goods trades do not bind
and show that the nominal exchange rate is indeterminate in such cases.
When Λik = Λ
f
ik =0f o ra l li,k =1 ,2, Ωik = βΩ0
ik for all i,k =1 ,2 (see (4.8)—(4.11)). That
is, all monies have the same rate of return, 1/β, regardless of which money it is or who holds it.










However, for a money to have a rate of return 1/β, its supply must shrink at a rate equal to the
discount rate, as stated below (see Appendix E for a proof):
Proposition 6.1. For there to be a steady state of a type O equilibrium with Λik,Λ
f
ik =0for
all i,k =1 ,2, the money growth rates must be γ1 = γ2 = β.I f γ1 = γ2 = β and each country
holds both monies, then all money holdings shrink at the discount rate, i.e., M0
ik/Mik = β for all
i,k =1 ,2. There is a continuum of equilibrium values of the nominal exchange rate.
Since money holdings all shrink geometrically at rate β, each money gives its holder a rate of
return equal to the discount rate, regardless of the initial distribution of the money between the
two countries. The nominal exchange rate, however, depends on the initial money distribution
across countries, and so the indeterminacy of the initial money distribution results in indetermi-
nate nominal exchange rates. This indeterminacy is a reminiscent of the result in Kareken and
Wallace (1981). However, indeterminacy is non-generic in our model, because it occurs only when
γ1 = γ2 = β.
267. Relative prices and real exchange rates
We return to the type O equilibrium with Λ,Λf > 0 and investigate relative prices. The proofs
for this section are straightforward and are omitted.18
7.1. Violations of the law of one price
There are violations of the law of one price in equilibrium. To illustrate, we deﬁne the following












The superscripts and the subscripts of the p’s have the same interpretations as those of the Q’s.
For example, p
f
ik is the price level in money k i nat r a d eb e t w e e nac o u n t r yi producer and a
buyer from country i0 6= i holding money k.
Corollary 7.1. Controlling for the seller’s country index and the currency used, a country 1
























Controlling for the buyer’s country index and the currency used, a country 1 seller charges the































These relative prices are greater than 1 if and only if θ1 > 1. Thus, they are equal to 1 when γ1 =
γ2, and greater than one either when γ2 < γ1 < 1 or when γ1 ≈ γ2 > 1 and (γ1−γ2)(γ2−γa) < 0.
The law of one price holds when γ1 = γ2; otherwise it is violated. When money growth rates
are not too high (i.e., if γ1,γ2 < γa), the violation of the law of one price is as follows. There is
price discrimination against buyers from the country whose money grows more quickly than the
18For the proofs, express all variables as functions of (θ1,Q 11,Q 21) using (5.2)—(5.5) and Proposition 5.2. Then
apply Lemma 5.3.
27other country’s, no matter where the buyers make the purchases and no matter which currency
they use. The sellers in the country whose money grows more quickly charge higher prices, no
matter where the buyers come from and no matter which currency they use. The opposite is true
when money growth rates are very high (i.e., when γ1,γ2 > γa).
These are strong violations of the law of one price, because the transactions that we use to
deﬁne the above relative prices involve the same currency and the same country index for the
seller/buyer. Such violations occur because country 1 households value both monies less than
country 2 households if and only if θ1 > 1 (see Lemma 5.3). Thus, when θ1 > 1, country 1
households are willing to pay higher prices than country 2 households for any given currency and
any given country’s sellers; they also demand more money than country 2 households from selling
goods to any given country’s buyers with any given currency.
7.2. Real exchange rates
The violations of the law of one price generate deviations from the purchasing power parity, i.e.,
the real exchange rate is not one. The standard notion of the real exchange rate is the relative
price of goods sold by country 1 sellers to goods sold by country 2 sellers, after converting the
prices into the same currency.19 There are a variety of relative prices between the two countries’
goods in the current model, depending on the extent to which we want to restrict the types of
transactions involved. The relative prices in (7.3) are narrow measures of the real exchange rate,
which ﬁx the buyers’ country index and the type of currency used. According to these measures,
country 1 goods are more expensive than country 2 goods if and only if θ1 > 1.
One can still ﬁx the type of currency used but aggregate over all transactions taken place in
a country with that currency. This yields a broader measure of the real exchange rate than those
in (7.3). We deﬁne the average price of goods sold in country i for money k (to both countries’
19One can also deﬁne the real exchange rate as the relative price of goods purchased by country 1 households to
goods purchased by country 2 goods, but this leads to the same analytical features of the real exchange rate.














,i 0 6= i; i,k =1 ,2.
The real exchange rate implied by these prices is
Rk ≡ P1k/P2k.
Note that we do not need to multiply this price ratio by the nominal exchange, because P1k
and P2k are already measured in the same currency (k). Also note that an increase in Rk is an
appreciation of the goods in country 1 relative to goods in country 2.
One can deﬁne an even broader measure of the relative price by aggregating over all goods

























Note that P1 and P2 are both measured in terms of money 2. The real exchange rate corresponding
to these prices is
R ≡ P1/P2.
Corollary 7.2. In a type O equilibrium with Λ,Λf > 0,








(α + θ1)(1 + αθ
1/σ
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Moreover, R>1 if and only if θ1 > 1.
The diﬀerent measures of the real exchange rate all have the same value in equilibrium. The
purchasing power parity is violated, unless the two monies have the same growth rate (in which
case θ1 = 1). Country 1 goods are more expensive than country 2 goods if and only if country 1
holds a larger fraction of money 1 (and money 2) than country 2. With Lemma 5.3, this implies
that the real exchange rate is greater than one if (i) γ2 < γ1 < 1, or (ii) γa > γ1 > γ2 > 1a n d
γ1 ≈ γ2. These deviations from the purchasing power parity directly reﬂect the price diﬀerentials
29in Corollary 7.1. For example, if money 1 grows more quickly than money 2 (but γ1,γ2 < γa),
then country 1 households hold more of each currency, their sellers charge higher prices, and so
goods in country 1 are more expensive than goods in country 2.
Another interesting feature is that the real exchange rate and the nominal exchange rate may
or may not move in the same direction in the steady state when responding to monetary shocks.
Starting from a common growth rate γ for the two monies, we consider a marginal increase in
the growth rate of money 1 and unchanged growth of money 2. In this case, money 1 depreciates
against money 2 and so the nominal exchange rate e falls (see Proposition 5.2). In contrast,
the real exchange rate rises if γ < γa and falls if γ > γa. The explanation is as follows. When
γ < γa, only a moderate depreciation in the nominal exchange rate is necessary for eliminating
the potential cross-country inequality between the relative values of the two monies caused by
the shock (see the explanation for Lemma 5.3). This depreciation is not enough to balance the
increase in nominal prices in country 1 goods (in terms of money 1) relative to country 2 goods
(in terms of money 2), and so the real exchange rate rises. When γ > γa, a large depreciation of
the nominal exchange rate is necessary for restoring equilibrium, which dominates the increase
in nominal prices of goods and leads to a depreciation in the real exchange rate.
It is remarkable that our model generates violations of the law of one price and possible co-
movements between nominal and real exchange rates. Our model does not have the traditional
culprits of such anomalies, such as nominal rigidity, the existence of non-traded goods, “pricing-
to-market” by monopolistic sellers (e.g., Betts and Devereux, 2000), or the restriction on the
use of each currency to a particular country. What generates the results here is search frictions.
By limiting agents’ ability of making arbitrage between matches, these frictions generate price
diﬀerentials in even narrowly deﬁned categories of transactions, and hence the results discussed
above.
307.3. The wedge between the currency market and the goods market
With search frictions, the relative price between the two currencies implied by direct currency
trades (i.e., the nominal exchange rate e)i sd i ﬀerent from the relative price implied by money-
goods trades. In money-goods trades, there are four narrowly deﬁned relative prices between the
two monies:






i1,i =1 ,2. (7.5)
These deﬁnitions have controlled for the sellers’ country index (the subscript i) and the buyers’
country index (the superscript). ρ1 is the relative price between the two monies implied by trades
between country 1 sellers and country 1 buyers using the two monies, and ρ
f
1 is the relative price
between the two monies implied by trades between country 1 sellers and country 2 buyers using
the two monies.20 It can be veriﬁed that ρi = ρ
f




From the features of N11 in Proposition 5.2, we know that r<1 if and only if γ1 > γ2.T h a t
is, the relative price of money 1 to money 2 in the goods market exceeds that in the currency
market if and only if money 1 grows more quickly relative to money 2. Moreover, r decreases in γ1
and increases in γ2, which implies e−1 |de/dγk| > ρ−1 |dρ/dγk| for k =1 ,2. That is, the nominal
exchange rate responds to money growth shocks more than does the relative price between the two
currencies implied by the goods market. This discrepancy between the two markets arises for two
reasons. First, direct currency exchanges are a less time-consuming way to trade monies than
goods-market exchanges. Second, direct currency exchanges transfer money balances between
countries perfectly (linearly), while goods market exchanges transfer money balances imperfectly
(non-linearly) due to the convex production cost function.
Previous models of multiple currencies do not generate this discrepancy between the relative
prices in the two markets. In Walrasian models, where agents can make instantaneous arbitrage
20Since each of these relative prices involves prices of goods sold in the same country, it is qualitatively diﬀerent
from the relative prices between diﬀerent countries used in the deﬁnitions of the real exchange rate.
31between the goods market and the money market, the equilibrium has e = ρ. In cash-in-advance
models such as Lucas (1982), it is not possible to deﬁne relative prices like ρ, because the cash-
in-advance assumption prohibits households in a country from selling goods for both monies. If
one relaxes the assumption to allow all sellers to sell goods for both monies, then again e = ρ =1
as a result of arbitrage. In previous search models, either ρ is exogenously ﬁxed at 1 as a result
of indivisible money (e.g., Matsuyama et al., 1993, Zhou, 1997, and Wang, 2000), or there are
no direct currency-for-currency trades that explicitly deﬁne the nominal exchange rate (e.g., Shi,
1995, and Trejos and Wright, 1996).
8. Conclusion
In this paper we construct a two-country, search monetary model to determine the nominal
exchange rate between two ﬁat monies. Our model uncovers two essential ingredients for a
determinate nominal exchange rate, i.e., an agent cannot make instantaneous arbitrage between
trades in the goods market and an agent cannot bring diﬀerent monies into the same trade.
Unlike cash-in-advance models, our model imposes no restriction on which money must be used
in a country. The restrictions on arbitrage bind when money supplies grow at gross rates greater
than the discount factor, in which case the nominal exchange rate is determinate and reﬂects the
fundamentals of the two countries such as the initial stocks and growth rates of the two monies.
In addition to determining the nominal exchange rate, we have obtained three other main
results. First, there are direct currency trades between the two countries, unless both money
stocks are constant. A country is a net supplier of its currency in currency trades when both
monies have positive net growth rates and a net recipient of its currency when both monies have
negative net growth rates. Second, direct currency trades generate a lower relative price of money
1 to money 2 than does a chain of trades in the goods market if and only if money 1’s stock grows
more quickly than money 2’s. Both results arise because direct currency trades transfer money
balances across countries more quickly and less costly at the margin than a chain of trades through
the goods market. Third, there are violations of the law of one price and the purchasing power
32parity, provided that the two monies have diﬀerent growth rates. The cause for such violations
is not the existence of non-traded goods or price rigidity but the costly exchange process and
agents’ inability to make arbitrage between matches instantaneously. The magnitudes of such
violations are intimately related to the diﬀerential between the two monies’ growth rates.
The search friction in the goods market is indispensable for our results, but the search friction
in the currency market is not. Since all currency trades in our model take place at the same
nominal exchange rate, our qualitative results will hold in an alternative setup where direct cur-
rency trades take place in a centralized market. As long as the currency market and the goods
market are separated to prevent households from making arbitrage between the two markets,
the nominal exchange rate will still be determinate. An example is as follows. The goods mar-
ket opens before the currency market. A household dispatches all money holders to the goods
market ﬁrst, where the trading restrictions in our model apply. After the goods market closes,
the household makes instantaneous trades between the two monies in the currency market at a
Walrasian exchange rate, say ew. The set of equilibria is the same as in our setup. In particular,
if each household exchanges less than the household’s money holding in the currency market,
then Ω11/Ω12 = Ω21/Ω22 = ew and the equilibrium is very similar to the type O equilibrium.
We plan to explore the properties of the model further in the following directions. First, we
intend to examine numerically type I and type II equilibria, which are left out here because we
are unable to examine their properties analytically. Our conjecture is that the type I equilibrium
exists for large positive net money growth rates and the type II equilibrium exists for large
negative net money growth rates. This is because the agents from at least one country want to
exchange more than their money holdings in these cases and such a large volume of currency trades
is necessary only when there are large (positive or negative) monetary transfers that constantly
disturb the households’ money holdings from their optimal levels.
Second, we intend to examine numerically the dynamic response of the equilibrium to money
growth shocks and, in particular, to check whether real and nominal exchange rates can be
33positively correlated along the transitional path when responding to money growth shocks. This
analysis is important because the positive correlation has been a puzzle in international ﬁnance
(e.g., Mussa, 1986). Previous attempts to explain the puzzle have heavily relied on the assumption
of nominal price rigidity. Our model has perfectly ﬂexible prices and yet the two exchange rates
respond to money growth shocks in the same way in the steady state if money growth rates
pass a critical level (see the discussion on Proposition 7.2). It remains to check whether the two
exchange rates can also be positively correlated along the transitional path. This requires us to
go beyond the steady-state analysis and the deterministic environment.
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36Appendices
A. Proof of Lemma 4.1
To prove Lemma 4.1, we prove the following lemma ﬁrst:
Lemma A.1. Consider the decision of an individual household from country 1.I f ω12/ω11 >
Ω22/Ω21,at y p eI currency trade occurs but a type II currency trade does not. The terms of
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If ω12/ω11 < Ω22/Ω21,at y p eII currency trade occurs but a type I currency trade does not. The
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If ω12/ω11 = Ω22/Ω21,t y p eI currency trades occur if and only if ∆1 =0and type II currency
trades occur if and only if ∆2 =0 ; in either case the two agents both obtain zero surplus and
trade any feasible quantities at an exchange rate f22/f11 = Ω21/Ω22 (or f12/f21 = Ω21/Ω22).
Proof. We prove the above lemma for the match between a country 1 holder of money 1 and a
country 2 holder of money 2. The proof is similar for the match between a country 1 holder of
money 2 and a country 2 holder of money 1.





/Ω21. We call the equality form of this constraint the respondent’s minimum
surplus line. This constraint and (3.7) — (3.8) form the feasibility set of the trade, depicted by the
shaded area in Figure 1 for the case where the intersection between the respondent’s minimum
37surplus line and the bound f11 = m11/n11 has f22 <M 22/N22 (like point A1). The surplus
of trade to the proposing household (country 1 household) is (ω12f22 − ω11f11), and so the line
f11 =( ω12f22 − c)/ω11 depicts the combinations of (f11,f 22) that give the proposer a surplus c.
We call these lines the proposer’s iso-surplus lines. For the country 1 household to trade, it must
obtain a non-negative surplus. So, we consider only c ≥ 0. Note that the proposer’s surplus
increases when the proposer’s iso-surplus line moves southeast.
Figure 1 here.
If ω12/ω11 < Ω22/Ω21, the proposer’s iso-surplus line is ﬂatter than the respondent’s minimum
surplus line. The solution is (f11,f 22)=( 0 ,0), i.e., there is no trade. If ω12/ω11 = Ω22/Ω21,t h e
proposer’s iso-surplus line and the respondent’s minimum surplus line are parallel to each other.
In this instance the only case for trade is when the respondent’s minimum surplus line goes
through the origin, i.e., when ∆1 =0 .I f∆1 = 0, the solution is anywhere between the origin and
point A1. Both agents obtain zero surplus in this case.
If ω12/ω11 > Ω22/Ω21, the proposer’s iso-surplus line is steeper than the respondent’s minimum














As stated before, this solution is valid only when the intersection between the respondent’s min-






















These are the conditions given by the ﬁrst case in (A.1).
Still consider the case ω12/ω11 > Ω22/Ω21, but now suppose that the intersection between the
respondent’s minimum surplus line and the bound f11 = m11/n11 has f22 >M 22/N22.I n t h i s
38case the solution is at point A3a n ds a t i s ﬁes f11 <m 11/n11. A procedure similar to the above
shows that the second case in (A.1) applies and the requirement for trade, ∆1/2 ≤ Ω21m11/n11−
Ω22M22/N22,s h o u l dh o l dw i t hs t r i c ti n e q u a l i t y .
Now suppose that the respondent’s minimum surplus line passes through point A2. Then
t h es o l u t i o ni sa tp o i n tA2. Although the solution satisﬁes f11 = m11/n11, the constraint f11 ≤
m11/n11 is not binding to the proposer. To see this, suppose that the constraint f11 ≤ m11/n11
binds in this case. Then the proposer would like to oﬀer more money to the trading partner if
he/she had more money. Since the solution has exactly f11 = m11/n11, the proposer’s household
can make the constraint slack by reducing n11 slightly. This alternative choice of n11 increases
utility, contradicting the optimality of the original choice. Therefore, ∂f11/∂(m11/n11)=0e v e n
when f11 = m11/n11. (A formal proof is as follows. Let µI = ∂f11/∂(m11/n11). Suppose
f11 = m11/n11 and the constraint f11 ≤ m11/n11 binds. Then µI > 0. Also, since n11 is chosen
optimally, the marginal utility from changing n11 (given by the right-hand side of (4.12)) must
be zero. Now consider an alternative choice ˆ n11 = n11 − ε where ε is an arbitrarily small and
positive number. For suﬃciently small ε, the solution to the currency trade has f11 <m 11/ˆ n11
and so ˆ µI = 0. The right-hand side of (4.12) becomes strictly positive, which contradicts the
optimality of the choice n11.) This completes the proof of Lemma A.1.
Now we prove Lemma 4.1. Impose symmetry, as an equilibrium requires, so that ωik =
Ωik, fik = Fik, mik = Mik,a n dnik = Nik. We can compute ∆1 and ∆2 by substituting the
corresponding terms of trade from (A.1) and (A.2) into (3.5) and (3.12). Substituting the results
for ∆1 and ∆2 into (A.1) and (A.2), we obtain (4.4) and (4.5). When Π =0 ,o n ec a nv e r i f y
∆1 = ∆2 =0a n ds oat y p eO equilibrium exists. One can also verify that the two agents in a
currency trade each get a half of the match surplus in all three types of equilibria. QED
39B. Derivations for subsection 4.3
In this appendix we derive the conditions (4.8), (4.9) and (4.12) in subsection 4.3. The derivations
for (4.10), (4.11) and (4.13) are similar.



















































































From (A.1) and (A.2), an individual household’s money holdings have the following inﬂuence on



















where µI and µII are deﬁned in (4.3) in equilibrium. Substituting these derivatives into (B.1)
and (B.2), we obtain (4.8) and (4.9) in equilibrium.








































N11GI (ω12f22 − ω11f11)+ Y21



























To simplify, use (3.1), (3.3), (4.6), and (4.7) to obtain:
(Ωik + Λik)Xik =
B
σ










Substituting these relations and (B.3) into (B.4), we obtain (4.12). QED
40C. Proofs of Lemma 5.1 and Proposition 5.2
We prove Lemma 5.1 ﬁrst. Substituting Xik = X
f
ik = Mik/Nik into (3.1) and (3.3), we have the










The equations in (5.2) immediately follow. Using (5.2) and (C.1) we can write Λ and Λf from








































Substituting (Ω,Λ,Λf) from (C.1)—(C.3) into (4.8)—(4.11), noticing Π = 0, and imposing station-
arity (which implies M0
ik/Mik → γk), we obtain (5.3) and (5.4).
To get (5.5), we substitute Π = 0 into (4.12) and (4.13), resulting in the following relations












Substituting this into (5.3) and (5.4) we obtain (5.5). This completes the proof of Lemma 5.1.







Substitute the Ω’s from (C.1) and (5.5) into the conditions Ω11/Ω12 = e = Ω21/Ω22 (implied by













The second equality requires
A(N22)=1 /[θ1θ2A(N22)]. (C.7)
41Substituting (5.5) and (C.7) into (C.4), we have (5.7).
Lemma C.1 below shows that the solution to (5.7) exists and is unique. It also establishes
the properties of the solution N(γ1,γ2) listed in (i) of the proposition. Notice that (5.7) has
the following symmetry: If N11 = N∗ solves the equation for i =1 ,t h e nN22 =1− s − N∗
solves the equation for i = 2. Therefore, N21 = N11 and N22 = N12. This further implies
A(N22)=1 /A(N11) from (5.7), θ2 =1 /θ1 from (C.7), and (5.8) from (C.6). Clearly, (5.8)
uniquely determines e for any given (γ1,γ2) and initial money stocks (M10,M 20).
To see that the nominal exchange rate is a decreasing function of γ1 and an increasing function
of γ2, note that (5.7) requires A(N) to be a decreasing function of N. So, the right-hand side of
(5.8) is an increasing function of N(γ1,γ2). Given the properties of N(γ1,γ2)l i s t e di n( i )o ft h e
Proposition, the right-hand side of (5.8) is a decreasing function of γ1 and an increasing function
of γ2.S i n c e M2/M1 is also a decreasing function of γ1 and an increasing function of γ2,( 5 . 8 )
requires the nominal exchange rate to depend on (γ1,γ2)i nt h e s ew a y sa sw e l l .
To see why (D,θ1) satisfy (5.9) and (5.10), notice that the net receipt of money 2 by country
1 households in the two-way currency trades is Y12f22 − Y21f12 = eD. In the steady state, the
quantities M11/M1, M12/M2 and D/M1 are all stationary. The laws of motion of monies, (3.14)




γ1 − 1+αW11/N11 − D/M1






γ2 − 1+2 αW12/N12
,
w h e r ew eh a v eu s e dt h ep r o p e r t i e so fNik in (i) of the Proposition. With the same properties,
(C.5) implies M11/M1 = M12/M2 = θ1/(1+θ1). Substituting these into the above two equations,
we can solve (D/M1,θ1) and verify (5.9) and (5.10). This completes the proof of Proposition 5.2.
Lemma C.1. There is a unique Nii ∈ (0,1−s) that solves (5.7), provided γ1,γ2 ≥ β.M o r e o v e r ,







Then w(·) is a decreasing and convex function, with w(0) = ∞.A l s o ,W11/N11 = w(N11)a n d
W12/N12 = w(1 − s − N11). Let us suppress the subscripts of N11 and rewrite (5.7) for i =1a s
LHS(N)=1w h e r e
LHS(N) ≡
(γ1/β − 1)[w(N)]−σ +( 1+α)[w(N)]−(σ−1)
(γ2/β − 1)[w(1 − s − N)]−σ +( 1+α)[w(1 − s − N)]−(σ−1). (C.8)
Since w(·) is a decreasing function and σ > 1, the numerator of LHS(N) is an increasing function
of N and the denominator is a decreasing function of N,p r o v i d e dγ1,γ2 ≥ β.T h u s ,LHS0(N) > 0.
If there is any solution to LHS(N) = 1 then the solution is unique. Since
LHS(N) → 0w h e nN → 0, and → +∞ when N → 1 − s,
there is indeed a unique N ∈ (0,1 − s)t h a ts o l v e sLHS(N)=1 .
For any ﬁxed N, LHS(N) is an increasing function of γ1 and a decreasing function of γ2.
Thus, the solution to LHS(N) = 1 is a decreasing function of γ1 and an increasing function of
γ2.W h e nγ1 = γ2, LHS(N) = 1 if and only if w(N)=w(1 − s − N) and so the solution for N
in this case is N =( 1− s)/2. QED
D .P r o o fo fL e m m a5 . 3
For Lemma 5.3, the properties of D are apparent from (5.9). Now we show that Ω1k/Ω2k < 1i ﬀ
θ1 > 1. That is, Q21 >Q 11θ
−1/σ
1 iﬀ θ1 > 1. Recall that (Q11,Q 21) solve (5.3) and (5.4). Noting
N21 = N11 in the type O equilibrium, we can rewrite these equations for i =1a s












































In Figure 2 we graph these curves for given θ1 whose intersection is the solutions for (Q11,Q 21).
We also draw the line Q21 = Q11θ
−1/σ
1 . It is clear from the diagram that the solutions for
43(Q11,Q 21)s a t i s f yQ21 >Q 11θ
−1/σ
1 if and only if the line Q21 = Q11θ
−1/σ
1 intersects the curve
Q21 = L1(Q11) before intersecting the curve Q11 = L2(Q21). By solving for the intersections, we
can verify that Q21 >Q 11θ
−1/σ
1 if and only if θ1 > 1.
Figure 2 here.




> γ2 − 1. (D.1)
If γ1 = γ2,t h e nNik =( 1− s)/2 for all i,k =1 ,2a n ds oeM1/M2 = 1 from (5.8), in which case
(D.1) holds with equality, and so θ1 =1 .
Now, we consider the case γ1,γ2 < 1 and show property (ii) in the lemma. When γ1,γ2 < 1,
(D.1) becomes eM1/M2 < (γ2−1)/(γ1−1). Substituting (5.8) for eM1/M2 and (5.7) for A(N11),
we can rewrite this condition as N(γ1,γ2) <N a(γ1,γ2)w h e r eN(γ1,γ2) is the equilibrium value










Recall that N(γ1,γ2)s a t i s ﬁes LHS(N)=1 ,w h e r eLHS(N)i sd e ﬁn e di n( C . 8 )a n di sa ni n c r e a s -
ing function. Then, N(γ1,γ2) <N a(γ1,γ2)i ﬀ LHS(Na(γ1,γ2)) > 1. Notice that Na(γ1,γ2)i sa n
increasing function of γ1 when γ1,γ2 < 1. In this case we can show that LHS(Na(γ1,γ2)) is an
increasing function of γ1.S i n c eLHS(Na(γ,γ)) = 1, then LHS(Na(γ1,γ2)) > 1i ﬀ γ1 > γ2.T h a t
is, θ1 > 1i ﬀ γ1 > γ2.
Now consider the case γ1,γ2 > 1 and show property (iii) in the lemma. When γ1,γ2 > 1, (D.1)
becomes eM1/M2 > (γ2−1)/(γ1−1), which is equivalent to LHS(Na(γ1,γ2)) < 1. Now Na(γ1,γ2)
is a decreasing function of γ1 and LHS(Na(γ1,γ2)) can be either increasing or decreasing in γ1








> 0 ⇐⇒ γ > γa,
44where γa is deﬁned in the lemma. Suppose γ1 is close to γ2.W h e nγ2 > γa, LHS(Na(γ1,γ2)) is
locally increasing in γ1,a n ds oLHS(Na(γ1,γ2)) < 1i ﬀ γ1 < γ2.W h e nγ2 < γa, LHS(Na(γ1,γ2))
is locally decreasing in γ1,a n ds oLHS(Na(γ1,γ2)) < 1i ﬀ γ1 > γ2. Putting the two cases together,
we have θ1 > 1i ﬀ (γ1 − γ2)(γ2 − γa) < 0. QED
E. Proof of Proposition 6.1
By deﬁnition, M0






1)=γ1(Ω11M1). In the steady state this becomes (γ1 − β)(Ω11M1)=0 . T h u s ,γ1 = β,
provided Ω11M1 > 0 in the steady state. To show Ω11M1 > 0, notice that at least one pair
among (Ni1,Q i1)a n d( Ni1,Q
f
i01) is strictly positive (otherwise money 1 is not valued). Suppose,
for example, N11 > 0a n dQ11 > 0, then (3.1) implies
Ω11M1 ≥ Ω11M11 ≥ N1Ω11X11 = N11φ(Q11) > 0.
As argued above, this implies γ1 = β. Similarly, γ2 = β.
Imposing γ1 = β in (3.14), we have:
M0
11 = βM11 +( β − 1)M21 − ξ1,




21)a n dD is the net payment of money 1 by country 1 in
the two-way currency trades deﬁned in Proposition 5.2. If country 1 households hold a strictly
positive amount of money 1 and exchange for a strictly positive amount of goods using money
1, then Ω11M11 must be strictly positive. Multiplying the above equation by Ω11 and imposing
stationarity we have ξ1 =( β−1)M21, which in turn implies M0
11 = βM11 from the above equation.
Since M0
1 = βM1 also, M0
21 = βM21. Similarly, when γ2 = β,w en e e dM0
i2 = βMi2 for i =1 ,2,







Now we ﬁx the nominal exchange rate at an arbitrary level e and construct an equilibrium.
Recall that Ω11/Ω21 = Ω12/Ω22. To simplify the task, we construct an equilibrium for the case
where Ω11 = Ω21. In this case, (4.6) and (4.7) imply
Qik = Q
f
ik =( B/σ)1/(σ−1) ≡ Q.
45Then (4.12) and (4.13) are satisﬁed if and only if W11/N11 = W12/N12 and W22/N22 = W21/N21,
i.e., if and only if Nik =( 1− s)/2f o ri,k =1 ,2. Denote this common value of the N’s as N.
The other equilibrium requirements are (3.1), (3.3), M0
ik/Mik = β,a n dΛik = Λ
f
ik =0 . T h e
conditions (3.1) and (3.3) require the following for i =1 ,2:
X
f









These lead to ξ1 = D and ξ2 = eD. Since the requirements M0
ik/Mik = β (i,k =1 ,2) are
equivalent to ξ1 =( β − 1)M21 and ξ2 =( β − 1)M12, they now become
D =( β − 1)M21 =( β − 1)M12/e.
Finally, the conditions Λik,Λ
f













M11,M 1 − M11,
M2
e
− (M1 − M11)
¾
. (E.2)
Therefore, for an arbitrarily ﬁxed e (≤ M2/(M1−M11)) an equilibrium exists and satisﬁes the
following conditions: (i) the initial money holdings satisfy M120/M210 = e (but the level of M120
or M210 is indeterminate); (ii) the values of monies satisfy (E.2), Ωik = Ω (for all i,k =1 ,2) and
Ω = βΩ0; (iii) the quantities of goods traded in all money-goods trading matches are Q and the
quantities of monies traded satisfy (E.1); (iv) the quantities of monies traded in currency trades
are such that the net payment of money 1 by country 1 households is D =( β − 1)M21;a n d( v )
all the N’s are equal to (1 − s)/2. QED
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